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HUMAN DIGNITY AS THE FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
A Discussion of Kant's and Schopenhauer's Work with Respect 
to the Philosophical Reflections on Human Rights 
By Paul Cliteur, Amsterdam and Rene van Wissen, Den Haag 
I. Introduction 
Since the conception of human rights, there has been a wide consensus 
that they are beneficial to everyone. They concern self-evident notions, 
such as people's rights to freedom of speech, religion, and life. Yet in 
spite of the fact that the rights themselves are almost beyond criticism, 
their foundations are questionable. This applies in particular to the 
scope of the rights (i.e. whom they aim to protect). Human rights aim to 
protect human beings exclusively, and whereas the foundation for human 
rights gradually shifted from a religious one to a secular one, their limit-
ed range has remained unchanged over the years. Therefore, granting 
rights to other species, such as animals, has never been seriously consid-
ered. This is somewhat remarkable, since so many other emancipated be-
liefs have gained a strong foothold today. 
This essay discusses the rationale behind the limited scope of human 
rights. To this end shall be outlined how the perception of human rights 
developed through time. Especially Immanuel Kant's and Arthur Scho-
penhauer's views on this issue shall be analysed. Also, explorations shall 
be made to see whether human rights should apply to animals as well. 
11. A Brief History of Human Rights 
In 1948, the General Assemblee of the United Nations adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The preamble of the Declara-
tion explains its goal and foundation. 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity, and of the equal and inaliena.ble 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, 
and peace in the world. (Italics are ours) 
For various reasons, the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights can be considered a success. First, because it is a compro-
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mise between East and West. The West received recognition of its classi-
cal fundamental rights, which resulted in rights for individuals concern-
ing the protection of a private sphere, where government intrusion is not 
allowed; the East saw several social fundamental rights recognised. 
Second, because this was the first time a set of values was presented 
with a claim of universality, which was truly shared by a large part of 
the world community. Finally- and that forms the essence of this essay-
it is noticeable that this was the first time a set of rights was justified 
solely on the basis of human dignity. In the quotatio~ above, this i1l 
clearly discernible. This shift betokened a radical reconceptualisation, 
and a break with a longstanding and cherished tradition, in which 
higher law derived its status from divine will. Previous generations justi-
fied all law by reference to God's will. This religious basis for law is 
quite apparent in the Declaration of Independence (1776). 
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights [italics added]; 
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. 
The theistic foundation becomes quite clear in the italicised words. The 
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness derive their binding 
force from God's will. The theory on ethics behind this, is today known 
as the theory of the "divine command." It essentially holds that an 
action is either good or evil insofar it is or is not in accordance with 
God's will. Something is not good or evil in itself (which is the point of 
view of the theory of moral autonomy), but rather because God ordained 
that some things are good and other things are evil (which is the stand-
point of the theory of moral heteronomy). From a theistic perspective, 
heteronomy, or the theory of divine command, made perfect sense. 1 How-
ever, in the eighteenth century, a century of secularisation, the divine 
basis for good and evil became increasingly implausible. Therefore, 
people were looking for alternative foundations for ethics. One of the 
ways to understand the Enlightenment, is to see it as an attempt to find 
such a new foundation for the moral and political order. Thus, new con-
cepts were developed, which included "human dignity," and "inalienable 
1 This is well put by: James M. Gustafson, Religion and morality from the per-
spective of theology, in: Religion and morality, A collection of essays, Garden City/ 
New York: Anchor Books 1973, pp. 125-154, p. 126: "If God is One, in Western 
religious beliefs, and if he is (in some sense) sovereign, and if his will is a moral 
will, and if all that occurs is (again, in some sense) dependent on him, can one 
readily distinguish between a 'religious' and a 'moral' obligation? Between a reli-
gious and a moral relationship (or response) to God? If goodness is attributed to 
God- in giving his gifts of life to the world and man in sustaining and restoring 
human life- and if that goodness is (in modern distinctions) both moral and non-
moral, does man's gratitude to God require deeds that are moral and religious at 
once?" 
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rights." Dignity functioned as the basis for those rights, and in a way 
this dignity had a higher status than the rights themselves. 
Of course, none of this happened overnight. It is, in fact, doubtful 
whether the focus on the Enlightenment furthers our understanding. 
First, because the Enlightenment was preceded by theories that were 
afterwards considered specific for enlightened thinking. This applies for 
example to the theory of moral autonomy, mentioned above. Grotius as-
serted that even if there was no God (this, to him, was an horrific 
thought, .which he merely used as a thought experiment) the ius natura]is 
would still hold. 2 This makes him an early proponent of the theory of 
moral autonomy. 3 Grotius disconnected morality and religion, and con-
tributed to what has been called the "conceptual elimination of God," 
which started in medieval times. 4 It was not until centuries after that, 
though, that this theory would come to full fruition. Second, the empha-
sis on the Enlightenment is questionable because the latter included a 
number of theistic structures - even for the explanation and justification 
of the social order. 5 The example of the Declaration of Independence 
proves this, because the rights mentioned in the Declaration are still as-
cribed to divine will. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
the first legal document which offered nothing but human dignity as the 
ultimate justification for the rights included in it. Therefore, it can be 
regarded as the completion of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, and 
perhaps as an echo of that famous thesis by Grotius. 
Ill. The Secular and Theistic Roots of the Concept of Human Dignity 
If one were to try to find the origin of the concept of human dignity, 
one should first be more specific about the contents of the concept. 
When reflecting on the central significance of man, a statement by the 
philosopher Protagoras comes to mind: "Man is the measure of all 
things." However, Protagoras appears to have meant this comment in a 
matter-of-factly manner, which was not prompted by the conviction that 
man is a very elevated creature. 6 The way the idea of human dignity is 
2 Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis. 
3 Of course, every precursor has a precursor. In Plato's Euthyphro, the question 
is raised whether goodness is good in itself which causes the gods to desire it, or 
that something is good because the gods desire it. 
4 Hans Welzel, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, Gi:ittingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht 1980, p. 127. 
5 See: W T Stace, Religion and the modern mind, London: MacMillan & Co. 
1953. 
6 This is really only an observation, though; it is not a moral judgement. There-
fore it may not be entirely justifiable to consider Protagoras a protagonist of hu-
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portrayed in Sophocles's tragedy "Antigone," is more in accordance with 
the way it is perceived today. 
Wonders are many on earth, and the greatest of these is man ( ... ). He is the 
master of ageless Earth, to his own will bending ( ... ). He is the Lord of all living 
things; birds of the air, Beasts of the field, all Creatures. 
Man as ruler over the earth, with the ability to make everything sub-
servient to his will: the birds in the sky, the animals in the field, and all 
other animals in the sea and on land. The resemblance with Genesis is 
striking:. 
"And God said: let Us make people after our own image, so that they rule over 
the fish in the sea, the birds in the sky, and over cattle, and over the entire 
earth, and over all vermin which crawls the earth." 7 
Of course, one might claim this is not a panegyric to man's central po-
sition in the cosmos, but a panegyric to God. In a way, this is surely true, 
but the central position that is ascribed to man is manifest. 
The question then arises whether the Greek and the Jewish-Christian 
tradition agree on this point, in that both stress the importance of man 
as lord and master over nature. Although this appears to be the case, 
there is one clear difference, one of which Dutch historian Romein is 
well aware in his paper on the cultural-historical roots of the concept of 
human dignity. 8 Romein tells about a visit to the sales department of 
plaster casts at the Louvre. The statues of Voltaire, Goethe, Descartes, en 
Diderot were the best-selling ones, which does not surprise Romein. He 
considers these people as the prime bearers of human dignity. 9 One 
might ask why there is such an elaborate representation of enlightened 
eighteenth-century philosophers, whereas Jesus Christ and Augustine are 
absent. According to Romein, this has to do with the eighteenth-century 
breach with an older "cultural matrix," whose characteristics are the 
perception of sins, the belief in authority, and the communities in which 
people lived. 10 In his opinion, all three circumstances mentioned above 
are detrimental to the modern concept of human dignity. 
This appears to hold true, 11 and makes possible the detection of differ-
ences between the nature of the emphasis on man in certain Greek texts 
manism, as do J. V Luce, An introduction to Greek philosophy, London/New York: 
MacMillan & Co. Ltd 1960 (1920), p. 112. 
7 Genesis 1:26. 
s Jan Romein, Over de menselijke waardigheid. Uit de geschiedenis van een be-
grip [On human dignity. From the history of a term], in: Historische lijnen en pa-
tronen. Een keuze uit de essays [Historic lines and patterns. A choice of essays], 
Amsterdam: Em. Querido 1976, pp. 119-146. 
9 Ibid., p. 119. 
10 Ibid., p. 126. 
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and its nature in Genesis and in the psalm mentioned before. There are 
two differences between the conception of human dignity in the Chris-
tian tradition and in the secularised tradition. The first difference is 
that, according to the secularists, human dignity is autonomous, in the 
sense that it is not derived from the Creator. The second difference is 
that human dignity is "complete," in that it does not detract from the 
perception of sins, which is specific for the Christian tradition. Thus, the 
concepts of human dignity, as used in Greek and secularised traditions, 
as well as in the Jewish-Christian tradition, have different origins. 12 
. . .. .. .. . 
IV. Kant on Human Dignity 
The secularised concept of human dignity proved decisive in the devel-
opment of human rights. The rights mentioned in human-rights declara-
tions are no longer justified by reference to divine will, but by reference 
to the disposition of man; man is what Romein calls the bearer of human 
dignity. 
After this discussion of the concept of human dignity, the question 
arises how the secularised concept developed, and who were the major 
contributors to its development. There is one person who had a decisive 
influence in this field: German philosopher Immanuel Kant. The De-
claration of Independence was inspired by Thomas Jefferson and John 
Locke, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights- at least its founda-
tion in human dignity - might be contributed to Kant. It was Kant who 
first suggested human dignity was the anthropinon, and who convinc-
ingly repudiated the ethics of the divine command. 
He did so in a book that formed the groundwork for his later writings 
on ethics and law: Foundation for the metaphysics of morality (1785)Y 
Kant propounds an important difference between dignity and value. 14 In 
his "The empire of goals" everything has either value or dignity. Things 
11 Criticism on the idea of the original sin is, of course, a typically enlightened 
issue. See the American humanist Paul Kurtz, The courage to become. The virtues 
of humanism, Westport (Connecticut)/London: Praeger 1997, p. 95: "Many theists 
hold a bleak view of human nature; the doctrine of original sin demeans who we 
are." 
12 Attempts to rehabilitate the vocabulary of "sin," "devil," "demonism," from a 
secular world-picture, as Kolakowski does, merely lead to confusion of tongues. 
See: Leszek Kolakowski, Kan de duivel verlost warden? [Can the devil be liber-
ated?], in: Encounter, July 1974, and in: Essays van Leszek Kolakowski, Utrecht: 
Het Spectrum 1983, pp. 84-99. 
13 Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), in: Werkaus-
gabe, Band VII, Hrsg. W. Weischeidel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1981, pp. 11-
102. 
14 Ibid., p. 68. 
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that have a price are expendable; things that are above financial value 
have dignity. That which has dignity is a goal-in-itself; it does not have a 
relative value, but an absolute one; it is the "subject of an immediate 
respect". 15 
In Kant's view, only man meets this requirement. Only man, as a ra-
tional being, exists as a goal-in-itself, and not as a means for others. 16 
All things in this world merely have a relative value. This special posi-
tion man has designated himself, is closely linked to his ability to sub-
. ject himself to riiorallaw. Ethics are about duty and not about proclivity. 
To this end, Kant formulates his categorical imperative. He already offers 
a few variations on this, one of his central terms, in Foundation on the 
metaphysics of morality: 
(1) Act in such a way that the maxim of your action should be a general 
law (or, more succinctly, act the way you would want everyone to 
act); 
(2) Act in such a way that humanity is always treated as a goal, and 
never as just a means to an end, both for yourself and for others. 
Paul Deussen, a follower of Schopenhauer but also someone who has 
great sympathy for Kant's theories, gives the following example to illus-
trate the nature of the categorical imperative. 17 Supposing that one is 
hungry would lead to the necessity of one's eating. Kant would call this 
an imperative; he distinguishes between two imperatives: hypothetical 
and categorical ones. Hypothetical imperatives hold that if one is hungry, 
one needs to eat; but if one does not want to allay his hunger, one does 
not need to eat. The imperative that one needs to eat, only exists under 
the presupposition that one wants to lessen his hunger. 
According to Kant, he who adheres to hypothetical imperatives does ' 
not act in a truly moral fashion, but merely appropriate or inappropri-
ate; someone who does not make mistakes in this is not good, but simply 
sensible. 
Not so with the categorical imperative, though. This imperative is com-
municated to a person through their conscience, which says: "Do good 
and not evil." This imperative has no presuppositions, is not hypotheti-
15 Ibid., p. 68. 
16 In Anglo-Saxon philosophy, this topic is generally treated in the form of the 
question as to which creatures have an "intrinsic value". See: G. E. Moore, The 
conception of intrinsic value, in: James Rachels, ed., Ethical theory, I, The question 
of objectivity, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press 1998, pp. 28-42; Jeremy 
Waldron, The edges of life, in: London Review of books, 12 May 1994, pp. 11-13. 
17 Paul Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, Zweiter Band, Dritte 
Abteilung; Neuere Philosophie van Descartes bis Schopenhauer, 2. Aufl., Leipzig: 
F. A. Brockhaus 1920 (1917), p. 251. 
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cal (for instance in the sense that one wants to be a good person), but 
absolute. 
In Kant's theory, the will that is ruled by hypothetical imperatives is 
heteronomous; the will that is ruled by categorical imperatives is autono-
mous.18 
V. Kant's Influence 
Kant's ideas on moral autonomy and human dignity have greatly influ-
enced his contemporaries. This applies in particular to Fichte, the philo-
sopher who the history books consider as Kant's great successor. No one 
puts more emphasis on human dignity than Fichte doesY He asserts: 
"Everything that is now shapeless and disorderly, will be put in order by 
man, and that which is already in harmony will become ever more har-
monious - by laws that are as yet undeveloped." 20 Man "organizes the 
turmoil". 21 Not only does man choose the necessary order in things: he 
also chooses one randomly. There where man enters, "nature awakens".22 
The human body is the most spiritual thing that can be created by 
matter. Nature rejoices in being taken care of by man and being allo-
cated a place in the universe. 
"That is man; that is anyone who can say to themselves: I am a human being. 
Should he not to have this holy deference for himself, and shiver and shudder 
for his own majesty! - That is anyone who can say to me: I am. wherever you 
live, you, who has a human countenance." 
Needless to say, this is an enormous glorification of man. Fichte radi-
calises the idealistic impulses of Kant's thinking, in that he explains the 
whole of the outside, phenomenological world as a product of the activ-
ity of the self.23 In ethics too, the further development of Kant's thinking 
leads to a centering of man in the cosmos. 
18 Ibid., p. 254. 
19 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Uber die Wurde des Menschen (1794), in: ders., 
Werke, herausgegeben von Immanuel Hermann Fichte, Band I, Zur theoretischen 
Philosophie I, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1971, pp. 412-416. 
2o Ibid., p. 413. 
21 Ibid., p. 413. 
22 Ibid., p. 413. 
23 American philosopher George Santayana criticized the "egotism" of Ger-
mans. He did so in his Egotism in German philosophy, first published in 1916, 
then again in 1940. However, Santayana's criticism is not founded on ecological 
considerations, but on political ones. See: Edward L. Schaub, Santayana's Conten-
tions Respecting German Philosophy, in: The philosophy of George Santayana, ed. 
Paul A. Schilpp, La Salle (Illinois): Open Court 1940, pp. 399-415. 
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Another philosopher who played a pivotal role in stressing the signifi-
cance of the concept of human dignity as a foundation for ethics, is Wil-
helm Block. In his New foundation for the moral philosophy, published in 
1802, he was the first to take human dignity as the solitary startingpoint 
of ethics. 24 
Still, it almost goes without saying that Kant's emphasis on moral 
autonomy and human dignity contributed greatly to ethics. 25 Kant's ca-
tegorical imperative may not be that different from the golden rule that 
is to be found in all large world religions, but he was the first to give a 
solid justification of this principle, thereby cleansing ethics of all theistic 
references. He who is virtuous because God ordained it, acts in a hetero-
nomous manner and, from a moral point of view, improper. Only he who 
is virtuous out of respect for moral law, acts impeccably. One could put it 
differently: true morality is inherently autonomous, in the sense of being 
free from religious influence. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights can be regarded as the apotheosis of Kant's approach. The con-
cept of human dignity is presented as the foundation of a universal mor-
ality, and this is precisely what Kant had in mind. 
VI. The Drawbacks of Kant's Theory 
The Kantian approach has its downsides which, in a way, have been 
exemplified by Fichte's anthropocentric rhetoric. Like his precursor Des-
cartes, Kant creates an enormous gap between man and the rest of 
nature, by emphasising the .moral significance of the human personality. 
It is true that Kant does not view non-human animals as machines, as 
Descartes and the Cartesians did, but it is clear that he also believes that 
animals have only an instrumental, not an intrinsic value - no dignity. 
Man may do as he pleases with these "irrational animals," because ani-
mals are creatures with a completely different value. 26 
24 According to Arthur Schopenhauer, Uber die Grundlage der Moral, in: Samt-
liche Werke, Band III, Stuttgart/Frankfurt am Main: Cotta-Verlag/Insel-Verlag 
1976 (1840), pp. 631-815, p. 695. 
25 After that, the autonomy of morality was furthered in even more impressive 
fashion in two books that were both published in 1925: D. H. Kerler, Weltwille 
und Wertwille. Linien des Systems der Philosophie, Leipzig: Alfred Kroner Verlag 
1925 and Nicolai Hartmann, Ethik, Dritte Auflage, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1949 
(1925). Under the heading "Religion and myth", Hartmann discusses the correlation 
between religion and morality. The older philosophical ethics were always religion 
oriented. For hundreds of years, moral conceptions were derived from positive re-
ligion. But that is over: "Times of such dependence are surely gone." (Ibid., p.66). 
Derik Pmjit writes that, contrary to popular opinion, ethics as an independent-i.e. 
detached from religion - discipline, is quite new. It is only since the second half of 
the twentieth century that the autonomy of ethics is taken seriously. See: Derik 
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984, p. 454. 
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Kant also criticises Baumgarten, who believed that man had certain 
obligations towards creatures both lower and higher than he in the hier-
archy. Kant does not discuss rights towards higher creatures, but he is 
very much opposed to rights for lower creatures. He claims that animals 
have no self-consciousness and are simply a means to an end- that end 
being man. We may very well ask: "Why do animals exist?" whereas the 
question "Why do people exist?" would be erroneous. Man's obligations 
towards animals are merely indirect, because by adhering to certain 
rules towards animals, man indirectly imposes them upon himself. The 
following e;ample, which is derived from Kant, niay ~erve to illu~trate 
this. When a dog has faithfully served its master all its life, it deserves a 
"reward;" it does not deserve to be shoved aside when it is no longer of 
use. The reason for this, however, is that man thus cultivates his moral 
possibilities for himself, who is the only one to be able to make a direct 
claim to help by other human beings. 27 
It needs to be said that this assertion was not widely shared in Kant's 
days. He himself mentions Baumgarten, who thought that rights towards 
animals were possible. One could also look at Jeremy Bentham (1748-
1832) - more or less a contemporary of Kant (1724-1804) - who, in 1789, 
introduced a new criterion for the question whether animal's interests 
should be taken into account: "The question is not, Can they reason? nor, 
Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" 28 It is clear that this idea focuses on 
the similarities between humans and animals, rather than on the differ-
ences, in deciding to whom rights should be given. This was a completely 
different perspective than the Kantian one, one that became quite popu-
lar in the Anglo-Saxon community. 29 However, it was not really a con-
frontation with Kant's perspective, since Bentham did not present argu-
ments to refute Kant's thesis, but merely posited his own view, in a some-
what matter-of-factly fashion. Kant on the other hand did repudiate the 
empiricist philosophy (convincingly, according to his contemporaries). 
If one were to follow the perspective of Bentham and other British 
26 Immanuel Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798), in: W. 
Weischeidel (Hrsg.), Werkausgabe, Band VII, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1982, 
pp. 399-690, p. 407. 
27 See: the text and commentary: Immanuel Kant, We have only indirect duties 
toward animals, in: Louis P. Pojman (ed.), Environmental ethics. Readings in The-
ory and Application, Boston/London: Jones and Bartlett Publishers 1994, pp. 27-
28. 
28 Jeremy Bentham, An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, 
edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, London/New York: Menthuen 1982 
(1789), p. 283. 
29 Among others in: Peter Singer, Practical ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press 1990 (1979), pp. 48-72; same, Animal liberation, 2nd Edition, Lon-
don: Jonathan Cape 1990; same, How are we to live? Ethics in an age of self-inter-
est, Amherst/New York: Prometheus Books 1995 (1993). 
166 Paul Cliteur and Rene van Wissen 
empiricists, this would only pollute ethics, as an a-prioristic undertaking 
with all kinds of empiricist material. It was generally held that Kant had 
the better argument, and human dignity, as defined by him, was trium-
phant in continental philosophy. As a result, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights became the new foundation for human rights. 30 It is 
debatable whether this was a fortunate development, because a more em-
piricist approach might have been preferable. The "ability to suffer" 
might have proven to be more fertile soil for further development of the 
theories on the foundations of ethicS' and human rights. 
The reason for this, is that the "ability to suffer" is a better starting-
point for recognising rights for animals and even the ecosystems, than 
the dominating approach that is based on Kant's theories. His approach, 
which put an emphasis on human dignity, introduced an anthropocentric 
way of thinking about human rights. It is questionable whether this was 
a positive development. 31 But the question is if there are alternatives; it 
is clear that an approach would be desirable which, firstly, incorporates 
the core of the Kantian heritage (i.e. the moral autonomy); and secondly, 
mitigates- or better yet: eliminates- its anthropocentric aspects. 
Such a theory does in fact exist: at least, there is one with such a pre-
tence: the ethics of Arthur Schopenhauer. In 1840, Schopenhauer wrote 
an essay on the foundation of morality, 32 which merited a lot more recog-
nition than it received in the history of European culture. 33 In this essay, 
Schopenhauer elaborated on his thoughts on ethics first mentioned in 
Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. 34 For several reasons, Schopen-
hauer's ethics seem a better basis for an ecological ethics and a new 
foundation for human rights than the Kantian heritage. 
30 See for the cultural history of the term and the way it was rooted in the Ger-
man constitution: Bernhard Giese, Das Wurde-Konzept, Berlin: Duncker & Hum-
blot 1975. 
31 See for criticism on anthropocentrism, also: Alexander Glimpse, International 
environmental law policy and ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997. 
32 Arthur Schopenhauer, Uber die Grundlage der Moral, in: Samtliche Werke, 
Band Ill, Stuttgart/Frankfurt am Main: Cotta-Verlag/Insel-Verlag 1976 (1840), pp. 
631-815. 
33 Taylor calls Schopenhauer's The basis of morality as "one of the most original 
and inspired writings". Until now, it has remained "relatively unknown". See: Ri-
chard Taylor, Schopenhauer, in: D.J. O'Connor (ed.), A critical history of Western 
philosophy, New York/London: The Free Press 1964, pp. 365-384. 
34 Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I, in: Samtliche 
Werke, Band I, Stuttgart/Frankfurt am Main: Cotta-Verlag/Insel-Verlag 1976 
(1818). 
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VII. Schopenhauer Starts with Kant 
Schopenhauer had been inspired by Kant's philosophy, 35 but he drew 
conclusions from it that Kant himself would have considered impossible. 
Schopenhauer argues that ignorant people see the phenomenal world 
(i.e. the world as it presents itself to us) as the ultimate reality. Accord-
ing to Schopenhauer, this belief is erroneous, because that which we per-
ceive through our senses is merely a facade. It is an illusion, a world 
whose nature is presented to us b:y our senses. The world is only an 
"idea" - a mere figment of our imagination. The world of individual 
things, structured in time and space, is an illusion, a veil of Maya. The 
wise man can see through this, because he learns to see that time and 
space are an addition of the human subject to the world. 
The question then arises how to penetrate the true essence of reality. 
To put it in Kantian terms: "How do we get through to the thing-in-
itself?" Schopenhauer believes this is possible because man forms an in-
tegral part of reality, and because the deepest being within ourselves also 
forms the deepest being of reality. By means of introspection we can 
learn "that which holds together the world-in-its-essence" (see Goethe, 
Faust). This introspection is not an activity in which we are helped by 
reason, as Kant seems to think; we cannot observe ourselves from a dis-
tance, like we do with an object in the outside world. Introspection is a 
matter of intuition. When using our intuition, we know what man, and 
therefore what reality is in its essence: will (Wille). Our thoughts, the ex-
pressions of our individual will, our bodies, the things in the outside 
world - they are all merely manifestations of this single will. On the one 
hand, therefore, the world is representation or idea; on the other hand it 
is will: the world is both will and representation. 
VIII. Voluntarism: Bridging the Gap between Man and Animals 
So far, this does not point toward a philosophy that would betoken a 
huge step forward in the existing perspective on animals and ecosystems, 
compared to the philosophies of Kant and Fichte. However, this changes 
when we consider the following. Schopenhauer's voluntarism had the 
effect that something came to the fore "what is by now increasingly 
taken for granted," Richard Taylor, a present-day follower of the 
35 The criticism of Kant that Schopenhauer added as an appendix to "Die Welt 
als Wille und Vorstellung" begins as follows: "It is far easier to demonstrate the 
errors and mistakes in the works of the great minds, than to give a clear and com-
plete development of the value itself. Then the mistakes are separate and ulti-
mate." See: Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (FN 34), p. 561. 
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German philosopher, writes. 36 In Taylor's view, man is related to the rest 
of nature. He states that man is an animal that is a part of the animal 
world. He admits there are differences between human and non-human 
animals, but he claims they are gradual differences, not essential ones. 
Continental philosophers tend to connect such a standpoint with a ma-
terialistic view of reality, with Darwinism, 37 or with positivism. Scho-
penhauer, however, reaches this conclusion by furthering "idealism," 
which is also specific for the Kantian philosophy. Although Schopen-
hauer's philosophy·is idealistic, it has empiricist traits in that he .believes 
there is not as sharp a dividing line between the world of Sein (the way 
man is) and that of Sollen (that which man ought to do) as Kant sug-
gests. Traditionally, ethics or moral philosophy is not regarded as an em-
pirical science, but rather as a science that has more to do with ideals 
than with facts. Experience can never teach us what ought to be the 
case, advocates of this point of view claim. It can merely inform us on 
what people do, not on what they ought to do. Kant went so far as to 
state that it is irrelevant for the validity of a theory for even one person 
to act in accordance with its principles. 
Schopenhauer believes this assertion to be a mistake, for it is the phi-
losopher's task to describe the source from which stems our indignation 
or praise. Consequently, Schopenhauer thinks that ethics are closely re-
lated to a reflection on human nature. By contemplating this, he intro-
duced three basic motives for human behaviour: 
- Egotism, or love for the self. 
- Malice, or the impulse to harm others. 
- Compassion, or the impulse to keep other people's welfare in view. 
Egotism is the emphasis on the self; it is the most important Leitmotif 
for people. People always let their own interests prevail to those of 
others. 
Sometimes people are even malicious; i.e. they harm another person 
without securing any sort of advantage from this for themselves. Scho-
penhauer considers malice the basis of immorality. It exists exclusively 
in man, not in other beings. This made Gobineau characterise man as 
"L'animal mechant par excellence." 
36 Ibid., p. 363. 
37 See: James Rachels, Created from animals. The moral implications of Darwin-
ism, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991; Paul Cliteur, Onze Verhouding tot de 
apen. De consequenties van het Darwinisme voor ons mensbeeld en voor de mor-
aal. [Our relationship to monkeys. The consequences of Darwinism for our view of 
man and for morality], Inaugural address, Delft 1995. 
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Lastly, compassion is a motive for human behaviour that we consider 
"good." 
When we look at how human nature is ruled by egotism and malice, 
the question arises whether it is possible that we are driven by some-
thing other than these two motives. To be sure, compassion is a laudable 
motive, but it is doubtful whether it suffices to make man act. Schopen-
hauer believed it is possible for man to escape the forces of egotism and 
malice; it is quite rare, but it does happen. It can be seen in people who 
are capable . of experiencing compassion or . sympathy. Compassion or 
pity38 have to do with our identification with others who are afraid or in 
need. 
IX. Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant 
1. Not a Goal-in-itself 
With the above in mind, one can understand Schopenhauer's ethics and 
his radical criticism of the concept of human dignity as the foundation 
for law and ethics. A previous paragraph described that Kant believes 
the axiom that man should never be regarded as a means to an end but 
always as a goal-in-itself, to be the highest commandment. Schopen-
hauer sharply criticises the Kantian reflections on "goal" and "means". 
His criticism is rather concise: a goal is the direct motive for an act of 
will; a means is the indirect motive. 39 Kant, on the contrary, states: 
"Man, and every other being that is gifted with reason, for that matter, 
exists as a goal in itself. "40 Yet it is obvious that this is incompatible 
with the framework of concepts that Schopenhauer prese:n,ted. "Existing 
as a goal in itself" is a contradictio in adiecto. Being a goal means being 
wanted. Thus, every goal is only a goal with regard to a will of which it 
is a goal. Only in that context, therefore, of a will that is aimed at some-
thing, does the word "goal" apply. The term "goal-in-itself" is equally as 
pointless as the term "friend-in-itself". 
Kant's definitions "insult logic", as Schopenhauer puts it. 41 And not 
only are they an affront to logic, they also insult "true morality", which 
is even more grave. Schopenhauer is one of the few philosophers who 
compare Kant's perspective on ethics with the latter's statements about 
animals. 42 This is a test Kant's philosophy does not withstand, since he 
38 Perhaps this word should be avoided, because it can have evocations that 
Schopenhauer did not have in view. 
39 Schopenhauer, Uber die Grundlage der Moral (FN 34) , p. 689. 
40 Ibid., p. 689. 
41 Ibid., p. 690. 
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feels that all non-rational animals - and therefore animals - are merely 
things which should only be used as means to increase man's sense of 
well being. According to Kant, people can only have obligations towards 
other human beings. Of course, Kant agrees that the ill-treating of ani-
mals is wrong, but he feels its prohibition should be seen as an obliga-
tion of man toward himselfY Schopenhauer brilliantly captures the es-
sence of Kant's mentality about animals, arguing that Kant believes that 
one should only abstain from the ill-treating of animals because it is an 
exercise for just behaviour towards human beings. Animals in themselves 
·are completely outlawed: they are means, things that can be ·made com-
pletely subservient to man's caprices. 
The implications of Kant's point of view- insofar it concerns the atti-
tude toward animals, that is - are here explicitly considered shortcom-
ings of his theory. It is not the case that Schopenhauer theorises and 
takes for granted the implications and consequences for the relation be-
tween humans and animals. On the contrary, he uses this relation to de-
monstrate an issue where Kant's theory is seriously flawed. 
2. No "Absolute Value" in the Form of "Human Dignity" 
Schopenhauer is even more opposed to the concept of human dignity 
than to the other parts of the Kantian ethics. Schopenhauer challenges 
those who use the term human dignity without thinking, to think about 
it. There is a real danger of the term "human dignity" becoming a hollow 
phrase in which one can discover random rights and duties. 44 
Again Schopenhauer uses the arguments he also used in relation to the 
concept of the goal. According to Schopf:mhauer, a goal presupposes a 
will. The term "value" is the judgement of one thing in comparison to 
another. Therefore, the term "value" is comparative, or relative; relativ-
ity is the essence of the word "value." An incomparable, unconditional, 
absolute value, which the human "dignity" ought to be, according to 
Schopenhauer, is therefore - as so many things in philosophy - a concept 
that is impracticable. It is like the highest number, or the biggest space. 45 
This completes the discussion of Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant in 
abstracto. It is an incisive confrontation with the two basic terms of 
42 See: Albert Schweitzer, Kultur und Ethik, Munchen: Verlag C.H. Beck 1996 
(1923), p. 252 and onwards. Here one finds a similar approach. 
43 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Tugendlehre, Par. 16, 17. 
Schopenhauer, Uber die Grundlage der Moral (FN 34), p. 690. 
44 Schopenhauer, Uber die Grundlage der Moral (FN 34), p. 95. 
45 Ibid., p. 696. 
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Kant's ethics: a "dignity" which should not be thought of in terms of as a 
comparative magnitude, and a "goal-in-itself." Schopenhauer launches a 
quite frontal attack on Kant, by raising the matter that has been dis-
cussed in the above on several occasions: Kant's attitude toward animals. 
It seems that this is the core of his -criticism: Schopenhauer criticises 
Kant's ethics because of its anthropocentrism (although Schopenhauer 
does not use this word). 
X. Schopenhauer and Animals 
Schopenhauer believes that the specific reason why his own concep-
tions of morality are superior to other systems of morality is that his 
ethics also aim at protecting animals. According to Schopenhauer, the 
alleged "rightlessness" of animals, our pretence that our attitude to-
wards animals is without moral significance or that we have no obliga-
tions towards animals is seriously mistaken. 46 This attitude is totally dif-
ferent from that of other cultures: the Egyptians placed ibises, crocodiles, 
and other animals amidst their dead. Only in Europe is it considered 
horrendous when someone wants to be buried beside their dog. 
Not only the Jews are to blame, according to Schopenhauer. He also 
points his finger at philosophy. In philosophy, it is mainly the ideas of 
Descartes and Kant that have emphasised the unbridgeable chasm be-
tween humans and animals.47 
Schopenhauer tells a story about a man who had become very dis-
turbed after he had killed a monkey, which looked into his eyes before it 
died. Schopenhauer also gives the example of the idiocy of someone who 
shot an elephant "for the fun of hunting." When that man returned to 
the scene the next morning, all elephants had fled except for this little 
elephant whose mother had been killed the day before. That made the 
hunter see the error of his ways. He felt "true remorse" about his beha-
viour and he felt as contrite as if he had committed first-degree 
murder. 48 
Examples as the one mentioned above are understandable without the 
help of Schopenhauer's metaphysics. Eventually his ethics gain more 
depth, when one realises the background from which they have sprung. 
It has to do with the fact that individuation is merely an appearance, 
which in its turn has to do with the fact that space and time are not 
46 Ibid., p. 773. 
47 Ibid., p. 774. 
48 Ibid., p. 777. 
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rooted in reality, but in the human intellect, that uses them to learn 
about reality. 49 Schopenhauer regards as the highest attainable goal the 
identification with all living beings. He who recognises himself in all 
living things, he whose existence coincides with that of all others, only 
loses a small part of his life when he dies. He lives forth in all the other 
manifestations of the will to live. 50 
It is clear that this elevated ethical insight is hard to realise, yet this is 
invariably the case when an insight of this nature is formulated. It ap-
plies amongst others to. tl;le core of ethics.as it is presented to us by Jesus 
Christ, Albert Schweitzer, Ghandi, or Tolstoi. It is hardly surprising that 
many of Schopenhauer's followers did not adhere to his every recommen-
dation and its consequences: the negation of the will to live. Still, the 
ethical approach Schopenhauer advocates seems to be a plausible guide-
line. Perhaps no one has phrased this more succinctly than Paul Deussen, 
one of Schopenhauer's followers. Deussen argues that the true moral at-
titude lies in the possibility of "the extension of the ego over the outside 
world." 51 
Deussen demonstrates how we can bring Schopenhauer's ethics to life 
in our everyday phenomenal world. According to Deussen, there is a way 
in which the categorical imperative can make its entrance in the world of 
phenomena, because it expands its natural borders. First, because it re-
sults in treating one's family, compatriots, and lastly all others - even 
animals and nature itself -with the proper respect. 52 In the instinctive 
love for our spouses, our children, out countrymen, nature shows us the 
way through which eTas leads to filia and agape, Deussen argues in an 
attempt to reconcile Christianity with Schopenhauer's perspective. 53 
However, it is obvious that he introduces a rather idiosyncratic Chris-
tianity and that he interprets Schopenhauer's views in a way with which 
the latter himself would not have agreed. Under the pretence of follow-
ing in Schopenhauer's footsteps, Deussen proposed the elaboration men-
tioned before, which Christianity does not preach at all. Contrary to 
Buddhism and Hinduism, Christianity believes the moral community is 
limited to human beings. Kant's theory therefore seems to be more in 
accordance with Christianity than Schopenhauer's. 
49 Ibid., p. 811. 
50 Ibid., p. 812. 
51 Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte (FN 17), II, 3, p. 268. 
52 Ibid., p. 269. 
53 Ibid. 
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XI. The Significance of Schopenhauer's Philosophy 
for a New Ecological Ethics 
173 
The relation between Schopenhauer's ethics and Christianity is not our 
primary concern here. The important question is whether Schopen-
hauer's philosophy could form the basis of a new ethics, a new source of 
inspiration perhaps for a declaration of the rights of animals. This would 
be a declaration in which the rights and interests of other "earthlings" 
would also be taken into consideration. The answer to this question has 
·to be affirmative, and. hideed Schopenh~uer has furthered Kant's ethics. 
Therefore, the conclusions Deussen draws in his discussion of Kant is 
thinking in his history of philosophy are justified. Deussen is quite posi-
tive about Kant, yet there was a need for a completion of Kant's heri-
tage. There were loose ends, and that would remain unchanged until pro-
vidence sent us a man that was able to fathom the depth of Kant's philo-
sophy while making considerable efforts for its further development. 54 
That man, of course, was Schopenhauer. 
54 Ibid., p. 290. 
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